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NO LEGO, YES LOGO:
The Federal Court of Appeal Protects Innovation in
Kirkbi AG and Lego Canada Inc. v. Ritvik Holdings Inc.
By Sean Robertson†
It has been well said that the most successful form of cop- Court held that Lego was not entitled to receive trade-
ying is to employ enough points of similarity to confuse the mark protection irrespective of the Lego indicia being
public with enough points of differences to confuse the popularly distinctive of Lego as the source of the wares.courts. 1
Following its earlier decision in Remington Rand,5 the
Court affirmed that the doctrine of functionality serves
to delineate what is properly the subject of a trade-mark.Introduction In Remington Rand, it was held that where a distin-
guishing guise primarily or essentially relates to thehe name ‘‘Lego’’ is derived from two Danish words
wares themselves, that functionality will invalidate theT that are the equivalent of ‘‘play well’’. 2 On July 14,
trade-mark. 6 In this case, the Lego indicia (except for the2003, the Appeal Division of the Federal Court of
inscribed ‘‘LEGO’’ name), were considered functional inCanada handed down its decision on this very matter in
all respects and, therefore, could not be a distinguishingKirkbi AG and Lego Canada Inc. v. Ritvik Holdings Inc. 3
guise in either the statutory or common-law sense of theThe case explored the potential for proprietary protec-
term.tion of wares beyond the expiration of a patent through
the commencement of passing-off actions under trade- The majority of the Court opined that Lego was
mark law. Whereas a patent is a monopoly on tech- attempting to extend its monopoly beyond the bargain
nology for a limited period of time, a trade-mark is a struck with the public when it was granted a patent. 7
potentially perpetual monopoly on a mark that serves to Permitting protection for the utilitarian features of Lego
indicate the source of the product to the public. 4 A mark blocks under the trade-marks regime would have set a
may take the form of a name or a logo on the product or precedent for Lego and others to acquire a renewable
its wrapping, as opposed to the subject matter of a monopoly on their wares. Inevitably, this would act as a
patent, which is the engineering or functional essence of disincentive for innovation and render it difficult for
a product. Additionally, where a mark takes the form of competitors to enter the market. In disallowing the
the shaping of the wares themselves or their wrapping, it passing-off action, the Court decided in favour of compe-
is referred to as a ‘‘distinguishing guise’’. The decisions tition and innovation by ensuring that formerly pro-
address the elusiveness of trade-mark protection for tected patent knowledge flows to the public realm.8 This
unregistered and registered distinguishing guises that article will discuss the case at the trial and appellate
relate primarily to the functionality of the wares. levels. It will specifically address the underlying policy
debate between the majority and the dissenting deci-Kirkbi AG and Lego Canada Inc., the appellants
sions at the Federal Court of Appeal. The author will(‘‘Lego’’), claimed that the configuration of the top of
compare this debate to two similar international casestheir blocks — i.e., the arrangement of cylindrical studs
involving Lego’s infamous intellectual property litigation.with the ‘‘LEGO’’ name inscribed on their tops (the
With this recent finding in the 40-year-old saga of inter-‘‘Lego indicia’’) — constituted a distinguishing guise.
national case law surrounding Lego’s trade-markLego contended that Ritvik Holdings Inc. (‘‘Ritvik’’), the
enforcement strategy, the Appeal Division of the Federaldefendant, had infringed upon its distinguishing guise by
Court of Canada joins the ranks of several other courtsthe manufacture and sale of its Micro line of building
that have similarly excluded protection for Lego basedblocks, a plastic toy system very similar to Lego blocks.
on the doctrine of functionality. 9 The comment con-Despite its functionality, Lego convinced the Court that
cludes with some suggestions as to the implications ofthe Lego indicia had acquired a distinctiveness as to
this decision in respect of its implicit endorsement ofsource for the Canadian public, the hallmark of a trade-
mark. However, in a 2-1 decision, the majority of the
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142 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
branding and marketing, especially in the context of within the common-law definition of that term.15 Lego’s
functional modular products, such as Lego. In seeking to alleged distinguishing guise was found unable to support
uphold competition by allowing others to use the utilita- an action for passing-off. In conclusion, Ritvik was held
rian elements of expired patents, trade-mark law raises not to have contravened paragraph 7(b) of the Act on the
the potential for competitors to ‘‘piggy-back’’ on the basis that to whatever degree it had adopted the Lego
goodwill of established competitors. This has created a indicia, it had not infringed upon a mark that was indic-
situation where branding and marketing have become ative as to source.
vital for incumbent manufacturers wishing to maintain In the alternative, Gibson J. questioned whether
proprietary protection. As a result of Kirkbi, the makers Ritvik had acted contrary to paragraph 7(b) by directing
of functional modular products have limited prospects of public attention to its Micro blocks by using the Lego
maintaining their monopoly rights through trade-mark indicia in such a way as to cause confusion in Canada.
protection outside of adopting an aggressive branding Gibson J. affirmed that paragraph 7(b) is the statutory
and packaging strategy, which could include a distinctive equivalent of the common-law action of passing-off. 16 He
ornamental dress on the ware itself or its packaging (i.e., a reviewed the evidence against the elements for the
distinguishing guise). We will briefly question whether common-law test for passing-off: the existence of good-
the innovation and competition imperative impelling will, deception of the public due to a misrepresentation,
intellectual property policy is served by a regime that and actual or potential damage to the plaintiff. In terms
endorses branding and its potential inefficiencies. of goodwill flowing from the use of the Lego indicia,
Gibson J. held that Lego’s goodwill — ‘‘in the sense of
benefit and advantage of the good name, reputation and
connection of its business’’ 17 — was derived to a certainDecision at the Federal Court–Trial
degree from the Lego indicia. 18 In respect of the decep-Division tion of the public due to a misrepresentation, the Judge
canvassed survey evidence and held that Lego had dis-irkbi AG et al. v. Ritvik Holdings Inc. involved Lego
charged its onus of showing the likelihood of confusionK launching a passing-off action against Ritvik, a
in the Canadian marketplace based upon its competi-Canadian toy manufacturer. Lego did not try to defend
tors’ uses of the Lego indicia. 19 However, he further heldits proprietary interest in the Lego indicia through patent
that Lego had failed to show that the misrepresentationlaw, since their patent expired in 1988. Instead, Lego
flowing from Ritvik’s adoption of the Lego Indicia was acontended that Ritvik had used the Lego indicia in asso-
deliberate strategy on the part of the defendant. 20ciation with the promotion and marketing of its Micro
Instead, the Court opined that the confusion in the mar-blocks. Lego alleged that the defendant had directed
ketplace was a product of Lego’s promotion of a func-public attention to its wares in such a way as to cause
tional modular product in a way that did not clearlyconfusion in the Canadian marketplace between its
distinguish a mark indicative of source from a markwares and those of Lego, contrary to paragraph 7(b) of
simply expressive of its engineering. This is to say thatthe Trade-marks Act. 10
Lego made few efforts in either the ornamentation of theGibson J. first queried whether the Lego indicia was
bricks or their wrapping towards the creation of a distin-a valid trade-mark and, thus, capable of supporting an
guishing guise or trade-mark as distinct from their pre-action for passing-off under paragraph 7(b) of the Act.
ferred embodiment. This situation left little room forThe Court was presented with expert evidence on behalf
competitors, such as Ritvik, to distinguish their own toyof Ritvik as to the functionality of each element of the
blocks. Gibson J. concluded that confusion without theLego indicia. Citing Remington Rand, Ritvik argued11
intent to misrepresent did not amount to passing-off. 21that a distinguishing guise is invalid where ‘‘a mark goes
Thus, Lego’s action was dismissed.beyond the distinguishing of the ware of its owner to the
functional structure of the wares themselves’’. 12 Lego
countered by arguing that there is no mention of func-
tionality in the definitions of either ‘‘trade-mark’’ or ‘‘dis- The Kirkbi Decision, Federal Court
tinguishing guise’’ in section 2 of the Act. It contended of Appeal that functionality only plays a role in the scheme of the
Act with respect to the registration and expungement of ego’s appeal from the decision of Gibson J. was
registered trade-marks and distinguishing guises. 13 In his L heard by the Federal Court of Appeal at Toronto.
decision, Gibson J. noted that the requirements of a stat- The Court presented itself with two questions. First, it
utory passing-off action in paragraph 7(b) do not evoke inquired into its ability to intervene in the findings of
either of the definitions of trade-mark or distinguishing fact by the trial judge in respect of the functionality of
guise as defined in the Act. 14 Instead, he affirmed that the the Lego indicia. The Court held that the standard to be
common-law definition of distinguishing guise applies to applied when reviewing such decisions at the appellate
this section. He cited the decision of the Federal Court of level is that of ‘‘palpable and overriding error’’. 22 After a
Appeal in Remington Rand, which held that a distin- brief discussion of the utilitarian nature of Lego bricks,































































NO LEGO, YES LOGO 143
Gibson J. that the Lego indicia were functional. Second, applied to address its non-existent monopoly. 31 Whereas
the Court addressed the question of the validity of trade- a registered trade-mark grants the exclusive use of a mark
marks that are primarily functional. It decided that this is to a trade-mark holder, Lego argued that an unregistered
a question of law and, therefore, the standard to be holder acquires only a qualified proprietary interest. It
applied is one of ‘‘correctness’’. 23 Citing its decision in argued that this interest is limited, as competitors may
Pizza Pizza Ltd. v. Canada (Registrar of Trade-Marks) 24 market products based on the same utilitarian features
and Remington Rand, the majority of the Court held so long as other incidental or ornamental material is
that where functionality is merely peripheral to the added to the product so as to eliminate confusion in the
wares, then that is not sufficient to preclude trade-mark mind of the public as to source. In other words, since the
protection. 25 However, based on the doctrine of func- doctrine of functionality is intended to defend against
tionality, the majority decided that the Lego indicia did monopolies, and the qualified proprietary interest of
not satisfy the definition of ‘‘trade-mark’’ as found in the unregistered marks supports healthy oligopolies, the doc-
Act and at common law, due to their primarily func- trine should not apply in the context of unregistered
tional nature. 26 Thus, since Lego could not hold a trade- trade-marks. 32 In the context of a registered trade-mark,
mark on its toy blocks, Ritvik’s adoption and use of the it was argued that the exclusive right to use means that
Lego indicia had not contravened the provisions of the the addition of ornamental or other elements to a trade-
Act. In short, a trade-mark that is primarily functional mark by competitors is not enough to avoid a successful
cannot sustain an action for passing-off under para- claim of injunctive relief by the registered owner (as
graph 7(b) of the Act. opposed to the unregistered context, where such addi-
tions may be sufficient). 33 It follows, argued Lego, sinceLego’s action was founded upon two principal argu-
registration inhibits competition, that the protectionments. First, based on a plain language reading of the
granted to a registered trade-mark should not includeAct, Lego argued against importing the doctrine of func-
functional aspects, as this would inevitably curtail inno-tionality as an interpretive tool. 27 Under the Unfair
vation. By contrast, since the qualified right of an unre-Competition Act, 1932, the precursor to the Trade-marks
gistered trade-mark supports competition, functionalityAct, functionality was expressly mentioned as a consider-
need not be a bar to the validity of a trade-mark. Legoation in the assessment of distinctiveness. Lego argued
further contended that the objective of avoiding confu-that since the Trade-marks Act does not mention func-
sion as to source for the public would be thwarted by ationality in the definitions of ‘‘trade-mark’’ or ‘‘distin-
universal application of the doctrine of functionality. Inguishing guise’’ in section 2, then functionality is not
conclusion, Lego argued that primarily functional unre-relevant to the existence of a distinguishing guise trade-
gistered trade-marks are capable of sustaining an actionmark; it is only relevant to the issue of registrability. The
for passing-off under paragraph 7(b) of the Trade-marksmajority of the Court rejected these arguments, and held
Act and that it was entitled to injunctive relief.that the provision from the Unfair Competition Act,
1932 on distinctiveness and functionality was never The Court noted that if the doctrine of function-
meant to be determinative of the separate question of ality did not apply to unregistered trade-marks, then they
validity. Instead, Sexton J.A., for the majority, held that would become more lucrative than registered trade-
the common-law doctrine of functionality ‘‘arose as a marks because holders of expiring patents could prolong
necessary part of trade-mark law as interpreted by the (or ‘‘evergreen’’) the protection of their intellectual prop-
courts over the last 60 years. Its purpose was to prevent erty over the functionality of their wares by remaining or
the obvious abuse of permitting a person to effectively becoming unregistered trade-mark holders. 34  In Whirl-
obtain perpetual patent protection by means of a trade- pool Corp. v. Camco Inc. 35, Mr. Justice Binnie described
mark.’’ 28 The doctrine of functionality was held to define the prohibition on evergreening as it applies to patents:
the limits of trade-mark protection for registered trade- A patentee who can ‘‘evergreen’’ a single invention through
marks under both Acts as well as for unregistered trade- successive patents by the expedient of obvious or uninven-
marks at common law.29 Regardless of the omission by tive additions prolongs its monopoly beyond what the
public has agreed to pay. 36the drafters of the Trade-marks Act in a provision for
distinctiveness, the Court held that the 60 years of judi- The appellant sought to evergreen its intellectual prop-
cial consideration of trade-mark validity through the erty protection not through the addition of uninventive
optic of the doctrine of functionality remained in force. features and the application for a patent, but by availing
Second, and in the alternative, Lego asserted that itself of trade-mark law and arguing that the doctrine of
the unregistered status of its distinguishing guise meant functionality did not act as a bar to unregistered trade-
that the doctrine of functionality did not apply. 30 The marks. The respondent successfully argued that Lego was
doctrine basically militates against the extension of attempting to evergreen its former patent on the wares
patent protection beyond the 20-year maximum period themselves through trade-mark law.37 Although holders
through trade-mark protection. Lego argued that since, of unregistered trade-marks would still face the difficul-
by definition, unregistered trade-marks do not enjoy the ties of proving validity and the expense of defending
unqualified monopoly rights attaching to registered their title from infringement, a fate avoided by the prima































































144 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
implied that the benefits of a perpetual monopoly would address the issue of confusion, which figured so promi-
more than compensate for these costs. 38 This form of nently in the dissenting reasons. 42 The majority’s focus
monopoly would grant unregistered trade-mark holders on functionality is a tacit endorsement of the proposition
a benefit that would exceed any available under registra- that the bargain struck between the inventor and the
tion. Such a result would usurp the reasoning behind the public with the granting of a patent must trump con-
trade-mark registry and lead to the uncertainty of owner- cerns for confusion as to source. In any event, market
ship it was created to readdress. forces would punish those with weak trade-marks. In
other words, competitive market forces and theThus, except for the imprinted ‘‘LEGO’’ script on impending expiration of a patent should animate Legothe top of each stud, which itself is a trade-mark, the and other manufacturers to differentiate their waresLego indicia did not serve to distinguish the wares in the from their essential form or preferred embodiment.sense contemplated by the category of a distinguishing
guise. The Court affirmed that the efficient design of the The majority decision is an affirmation of the liberal
top of the blocks was dictated by the demands of the economic policy informing the bargain between the
essence of the Lego blocks (e.g., ‘‘clutch power’’ and public and inventors along two poles: the duration of a
‘‘playability’’) and could not have been designed with the patent and the benefits of trade-mark registration. The
intention of distinguishing the source of the product. 39 doctrine of functionality is clearly stated as the legal
This is analogous to the finding by the Court of expression of this policy. In both common-law and statu-
Exchequer in Imperial Tobacco Co. of Canada v. Canada tory passing-off actions, the proprietary protection of
(Registrar of Trade-marks), 40 where it was held that the functional elements is limited to the life of a patent so as
cellophane wrapping and the red tear-strip of a cigarette to strike the balance between rewarding and encour-
package wrapper could only have ever been designed aging technological innovation. Regardless of the
along the lines of utility, with a mind turned to repelling acquired distinctiveness as to source flowing from a
moisture rather than formulating a distinguishing guise. design — whether Lego blocks, the triple-head of a
Philips electric shaver, 43 or an ergonomic foam shoulderThe case law reveals that while a trade-mark or a
rest for a violin44 — when the patent on a design that isdistinguishing guise may have a functional component
expressive only of its engineering essence expires, the(such as a bottle of lemon juice shaped like a lemon41),
doctrine of functionality places its guise beyond trade-where the shape of the wares or their containers, or the
mark protection. The effect of the affirmation of themode of packaging of the wares claimed for protection
doctrine of functionality also serves to buttress the trade-primarily relates to the wares and is lacking in ornamen-
mark registration regime. Since the doctrine was held totation, protection is properly granted in the form of a
apply equally to both registered and unregistered trade-patent or industrial design. Patent protection is usually
marks (and distinguishing guises), registration, and thediscussed in terms of a contract between the public and
certainty of title it confers, was affirmed as the basis forthe inventor; it is meant to provide a financial incentive
an efficient trade-mark regime. Thus, registered trade-to inventors in the form of a monopoly of limited dura-
marks retain a critical advantage over unregisteredtion as remuneration for their advancing of the state of
marks. In the end, the self-sustaining cycle of incentive,the art. The expiration of the monopoly is vital for
growth, and efficiency of liberal intellectual property reg-encouraging experimentation and competition in the
ulation is fostered in this decision by its delineation ofmarket. Patent rights are, therefore, a means for the
the duration of a patent and affirmation of the benefitsmarket to provide incentive for a self-sustaining cycle of
of trade-mark registration.invention, growth, and efficiency. If a patentee could
evergreen a monopoly — for instance, by pursuing
passing-off actions based on an essentially functional dis-
tinguishing guise — then society would witness a dimin- The Dissenting Opinion ishing return from its intellectual property regime: there
would be little incentive to advance the state of the art elletier J.A., in dissent, argued that where numerouson the part of the patentee or others, and the price of P players share the same functional design, competi-wares would remain inflated in the absence of the pres- tion dynamics will naturally force competitors to differ-sures of competition. entiate their wares, thus reducing confusion. Pelletier J.A.
In terms of Lego’s argument about piggy-backing on proffered that the existence of a qualified proprietary
reputation and the confusion as to source which could right to exclusive use for unregistered owners, and the
flow from the universal application of the doctrine of competition it engenders, was free from the risk of piggy-
functionality, the majority of the Court turned to the backing on the goodwill of the incumbent producer
legal definitions of trade-mark and patent protection. which would be produced by the majority’s decision. 45
Sexton J.A. stated that trade-mark protection is not the The implication of Pelletier J.A.’s argument is that the
legal vehicle to obtain protection for what is properly the majority reasoning, out of a blind adherence to pro-
subject of a patent. As the majority disposed of the case moting competition, abdicates its public service role of































































NO LEGO, YES LOGO 145
competitors to piggy-back. By contrast, the position of competitor infringed Lego’s rights and amounted to
the majority is that the inventor has already been remu- unfair competition. The BGH decided that although the
nerated for the invention and, at the expiration of the Lego indicia was functional, it could indeed be con-
patent, the invention enters the public domain. This is to figured otherwise and, thus, was not necessary. This is to
say that to require emerging competitors to alter the say that since the configuration of the Lego indicia was
dress of a ware that is rightly the property of society is to held not to be essential, the doctrine of functionality did
effectively grant incumbent inventors protection on the not apply. With this decision, competitors were free to
essence of the design which they are no longer owed. make their own functionally similar toy blocks, but they
This would produce an uneven playing field in the were barred from making blocks identical to those of the
market. Indeed, Pelletier J.A.’s position presents difficul- Lego system. In reaching its decision, the BGH held that
ties in cases where the augmentation of the ware, the Lego modular system was a single distinct market: if
beyond its preferred embodiment in the interests of not competitors could make parts for Lego systems, this
confusing the public, would require a scale of alterations would affect the sale of Lego. The BGH contrasted this
that would potentially render the competing ware less to the case of spare parts for automobiles; the manufac-
efficient, elegant, and marketable. Thus, Pelletier J.A.’s turing of cars and spare parts are considered two sepa-
argument as to the existence of competition stemming rate, but parallel, markets because the manufacturing of
from unregistered trade-marks would not be tenable in spare parts does not impinge on the primary market of a
all cases, not the least of which would be functional car manufacturer. Competitors are permitted to manu-
modular systems, where even modest changes to a facture parts for cars that they do not produce because to
design could nullify compatibility and competitiveness. not allow them to do so would give car manufacturers a
The result would be the uneven application and predict- monopoly in both their primary and subsidiary markets.
ability of trade-mark law; for some products, a change in As Cuonzo and Pike note:
the colour would be enough so as to not confuse the The BGH stated that the competitor was perfectly able to
public, whereas for others, the degree of change required produce its own set of interlocking bricks and there was
therefore no justification for encroaching on Lego’s hardwould act as a bar to competition and a de facto
won market by making bricks identical to and compatiblemonopoly would emerge, condoned by trade-mark law.
with Lego’s. With this reasoning the BGH struck a balanceOut of its overriding concern for clarity as to source, between on the one hand allowing competitors to enter thePelletier J.A.’s decision posits that the continued exploita- market of toy building bricks and on the other allowing
tion of the public by the holder of an expired patent is a Lego to protect its own set of bricks. 48
lesser evil than permitting piggy-backing on the good
The substitution of an objective test for functionalitywill of another.
with a subjective test for unfair competition informs the
smaller portion of the international case law involving
Lego. 49
Functionality in Germany and Italy Despite the fact that Klemmbaustein was not men-
tioned, the Italian Supreme Court applied the same eco-n place of the objective test of functionality presented
nomic rationale50 in the controversial case, Lego Sys-I by the majority, Pelletier J.A. presented a commercial
tems. 51 In contrast to the broad discretion available toethical argument that sought to avoid the confusion as to
the BGH, the Italian Supreme Court made its decisionsource putatively promoted by the objective test. Instead
under the narrower unfair competition provisions foundof focusing on the monopoly that Lego holds on inter-
in Article 2598(1) of the Italian Civil Code and relatedlocking toy block systems, this argument addresses the
case law. Lego appealed the decisions of Milan’s Districtunfair competition that results where competitors are
and Appeal Courts, which held that Tyco and otherpermitted to imitate a product and piggy-back on both
competitors were free to copy the functional aspects ofits development and goodwill. Decisions in some Euro-
Lego blocks so long as its patents had expired. In over-pean courts have also tackled unfair competition within
turning the decisions of the lower courts, the Supremea commercial ethical framework, but from a different
Court held that although the Lego indicia were func-angle; with recourse to the distinction between function-
tional, they were not necessary; competitors were free toality and necessity. 46
produce functionally similar blocks (i.e., those withIn the famous and controversial case, Klemmbaus- ‘‘clutch power’’) provided that the form of the blocks,tein, 47 Lego successfully sought protection under the law such as the arrangement of the cylindrical studs, wasof unfair competition against the copying of its bricks different. The Italian Supreme Court sought to strike afollowing the expiration of its patent. The German balance between protecting Lego’s investment andUnfair Competition Act is drafted in broad language research, and affording competitors the opportunity towhich has allowed the German courts to decide unfair market functionally similar blocks.competition issues with a degree of latitude commensu-
rate with the evolving requirements of the business com- Although the reasoning of these courts supports the
munity. The German Bundesgerichtshof (‘‘BGH’’) held protection of functional modular systems, it becomes































































146 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
nant manufacturer, because such protection actually on uninventive ‘‘improvements’’. However, the policy
would serve to support a monopoly. The result would be behind the decision would undoubtedly maintain that
similar to one where a decision was motivated by con- the pressures of competition in the market would act as
cerns for piggy-backing and confusion, such as that prof- a corrective to ensure that any gross complacency
fered by Pelletier J.A. It may be argued that these com- towards invention would result in consequences to the
mercial ethical arguments do not strike a balance bottom line.
between rewarding an inventor and stimulating innova-
This case deals with functional modular designs.tion and economic growth, but instead produces a les-
Products that would fall into this category would includesening of competition. In the context of a modular ware
not only Lego toy blocks, but also an array of productsand a monopolistic market, such as in the case of Lego, it
whose ‘‘simple’’, efficient engineering and unadornedis dubious whether other players can realistically com-
aesthetic both flow from function, on the one hand, andpete without recourse to a level of imitation synonymous
are a source of distinctiveness, on the other. Inventors ofwith compatibility. 52
such products are naturally disinclined to adopt guises
that would interfere with their engineering, as they have
already adopted the preferred embodiment. Neverthe-Conclusion 
less, this decision highlights that the interrelationship of
irkbi AG and Lego Canada Inc. v. Ritvik Holdings patent and trade-mark law necessitates branding andK Inc. stands for the proposition that although a dis- marketing, as well as the adoption of an incidental ele-
tinguishing guise may have a functional element, the ment or ornament. An illustrative example of a company
extent to which it relates primarily to the wares them- that has faced these intellectual property challenges is
selves — where the form or wrapping of a product is Interface, the world’s largest manufacturer of flooring. 53
really a result of its engineering and not its marketing — This company chose fashionable colour combinations
it ceases to be a distinguishing guise and becomes a and patterns in its design of an extensive line of func-
matter more properly protected under patent law. This tional modular floor tiles. It also adopted a stylized logo
decision leads to the conclusion that where the form based on the (functional) adhesive dots used to anchor
and, in this case, distinctiveness of a ware are purely the tiles to the floor. Part of its branding has also
drawn from its functionality, as opposed to an ornamen- included its commitment to significantly reducing the
tation intended to mark the source of the product, there company’s environmental footprint. Along with its com-
are two possibilities open for those seeking monopolistic pelling catalogue marketing, Interface has marshaled its
proprietary rights. First, these rights could be pursued by putatively ‘‘ephemeral rights’’ 54 in 19.69  19.69 inch
means of obtaining a patent. Second, where the first tiles into not only consistently successful sales but also a
alternative is unavailable or its expiration date is means of maintaining enforceable trade-mark protec-
approaching, (would-be) trade-mark holders could tion.
undertake a range of strategies in the hopes of
engendering goodwill towards the ware before others are Because of the opportunity for piggy-backing and
able to exploit the patent. These strategies may include the affirmation of the duration of patents in the majority
adding non-functional material (or an ‘‘innocuous varia- decision, clever branding and marketing will only be
tion’’), adopting distinctive packaging, and pursuing an encouraged. In addition to manufacturers competing for
aggressive branding scheme. consumers based on reputation, quality, innovation, and
This case suggests that if one designs a product in an price, one may argue that the intellectual property
efficient way, based on principles of functionality, then regime has ensured that branding and marketing forever
one cannot expect to be able to extend a patent over the play a critical role. In other words, instead of the public
product with a trade-mark based on that efficient design. being free to reward producers for superior functional
Furthermore, if one produces wares that are modular modular products — the beauty and identity of which
(such as a system of interlocking blocks, or any other flow from their function — the public is motivated to
wares designed in the preferred embodiment), then reward them for something arguably external to both
there is even less of an opportunity for an extended the efficient advancement of the art or science and the
monopoly than if one produces wares that are less sustainability of the economy: their spin. 55 In the case of
refined or non-modular, because the latter can be more Interface, we have seen this spin take an environmentally
readily the subject of a new patent for an innovation sustainable form. It remains to be seen whether the self-
and/or distinguishing guise. From the one perspective, sustaining cycle of innovation that intellectual property
this decision seems to encourage inventors interested in law aims to uphold benefits in the many other instances
long-term monopoly rights to advance the state of the art where the efforts of advertisers and marketing profes-
only so far as necessary to attract customers, but not so sionals, as opposed to designers, engineers, and environ-
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